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Abstract
We study the relationshipbetween wealth accumulation and labour mar-
ket transitions. Point of departure is a structural life cycle model which
serves as a basis for an empirical n~uced forrn specification. 7ite life cycle
model describes the behaviourofan expected utility maximizing individual
who is faced by uncertainty in the availability of jobs and by risk of lay-
ofi. Zhese types of uttcertainty introduce income uncertainty, which in tum
provides a motive for precautionary saving. 'Ilte structural model generates
two empirically implementable relationships. First, there is an Euler equa-
tion and the model implies that it should include labour market status as an
~This paper used to have the working title: ESTIMATING A MODEL OF SAVING AND
LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS WITH DUTCH DATA. NWO is thanked for providing
financial support. Rob Alessie, Thierry Magnac, Annamaria Lusardi, Arie Kapteyn and Arthur
van Soest are thanked for their helpful sugg~tions. Statistics Nuherlands (CBS) is thanked for
pmviJingthe dala.explanatory variabk. Second, the model implies that the probability of a
labourmarket transition depends on theamount ofwealth lagged one period.
Under certain assumptiot~s, the stmctural model implies a negative effect of
the amount of wealth on the probability of becoming or staying employod.
A reduoed form model of labour market transitions is spxified in order to
test for this implicffiion. Estimation of various specifications rcve.al that
unobserved hderogeneity plays an important rok in explainingthe rclation
between transitionsand wealth.1
1 Introduction
In this paper we assess the relationship between wealth accumulation and
labour market transitions.
Many studies have appeared in which the life cycle model is used as a basis for
explaining consumption and saving behaviour over time, see e.g. Deaton (1992)
for an overview. There are several examples in the literature (MaCurdy (1983),
Hotz, Kydland and Sedlacek (1988)) that include labour supply in the life cycle
model. In these models the availability of ajob is certain, and the individual can
choose the optimal amount of working hours within each period. Estimation of
these models is usually based on the Euler equations, which definean orthogonality
condition based on the first order condition for optimal consumption and Iabour
supply, making use of GMM as developed by Hansen and Singleton (1982).
These models do not describe the process of transitions between different
labour market states: A process that is subject to restrictions on the demand side
of the labour market and in which non-working individuals may be involuntarily
unemployed, and employed individuals are faced by a lay-of[ risk.
Uncertainty about future labour market status is closely related to income
uncerainty. Income uncertainty is often used as an explanation for the presence
ofprecautionary savings, and as an explanation for deviations ofthe consumption
pattern from the pattern implied by the standard life cycle model, see e.g. Zeldes
(1989). Someone's labour market opportunities and risk of Iay-off probably are
the most tangible components of income uncertainty.
Reduced form models of labour market transitions are relatively easy to es-
timate. It is problematic, however, to explain both the saving decision and the
labour market transition process in one structural model and estimate the pa-
rameters simultaneously. In structural search models that explain labour market
transitions, savings are generally set to uro, even though these models claim to
explain intertemporal behaviour, sce e.g. Blcemen (1992).
There are a few studies in which attention is focussed on the relation between
savings (wealth accumulation) and labour market state. In the model by Danforth2
(1979), an individual maximius intertemporal utility, whicó is a function of
consumption in each period. Monrover, the individual can choose each periad
whether or not to work. The latter decision influences the budget available for
consumption. The emphasis is on the implications ofthe assumptionofdecreasing
absolute risk aversion on the relstion between wealth and choice oflabour market
state. It is shown that under this assumption, a higheramount of wealth decreases
the probability ofjob acoeptance.
Blundell, Magnac and Meghir (1994) specify a model of expected life time
udlity maximisation. Here, utility not only depends on consumption, but on
labour market state as well. 7iiey introduce job offers as a random process, and
allaw for risk of Iay-off. Under the assumption that leisure is a normal good,
they aro able to derive a negative reladon between wealth at the beginning of thc
period and the probability ofstaying or becoming employed. They also show that
an Euler equation holds. Their emphasis is on finding conditions under which
all the structural model parameters can be identified without needing to solve the
whole dynamic programmiag problem. The Iatter is complicated because of the
mixed discrote-continuous naturo of the problem. Dynamic models of discrete
choice are complicated to solve, but more and more methods of estimation are
becoming available (Keane and Wolpin (1994a), Hotz and Miller (1993)). A
model of mixed discrete-continuous type is almost impossible to solve because
of the infinite number of values the continuous variable can take. Keane and
Wolpin ( 1994b) deal with this problem by discretizing tbe continuous variable and
dividing it into classes. Nevertheless, the number of alternatives to evaluate for
the solution ofthe dynamic programming problem will be numerous.
Stancanelli (1995) estimates a n~uced form empirical specification with UK
data, motivated by the work of Danforth (1979).
ln the present paper, the model by Blundell, Magnac and Meghir (1994) is
taken as point of departure. We estimate tbe Euler equation and a reduced form
model oflabour market transitions on Dutch daw from thc Socio-Economic Wane)
(SEP), collected by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). An eztensive description of the3
dataset can be found in Alessie, Pradhan and 7~ndvliet (1993).
In section 2 we describe the model and indicate the empirical specification
that can be derived form it. In section 3 empirical results aro presented. First
of all we present the results of estimating the Euler equation, after which various
specifications of a model of labour market transitions are estimated. Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Preferences, budget constraint and arrival rates
In this section we fotmulate the model of consumption and labour market
transitions, following Blundell, Magnac and Meghir (1994). Point ofdeparture is
the rational, forward looking individual, who maximizes life-time utility, subject
to the intertemporal budgetconstraint, and subject to thejob offer arrival process,
both specified below. We now specify the main ingredients, which are the utility
function, the budget constraint and thejob offer arrival process.
~ Utili
The utility function in period t is assumed to be a function of
- period t consumption, ci
- labour mazket state d~, with
dt - 1 ifemployed
d~ - 0 if unemployed
The period t utility function can be written as
ue - u(ce, ~) (1)
The intertemporal utility functionis adiscounted sumof intratemporal utility
functions. The objective is to maximize expected life time utility, subject
to the job offer azrival process and the intertemporal budget constraint. The4
choice variables are consumption and labour market status. At tirrte uro,
the individual faces the following decision problem:
T
maJC EO~~u(cerdt) f WTfi(ATtI) (2~
{ce.d,}e~ eso
subject to
- job offer arrival process
- budget constraint
in which ~3 rrspresents the subjective rate of discount, and T represents
working life-dme. WTti(AT~1) is the terminal value function.
. The budget constnunt
It is assumed that at time t, the individual knows the wage income, wi, that
can be earned while employed, and the benefit income, b~, thatcan be eanaed
while unemployed. Furthermore, assume that there is an amount of state
independent, or non-labour, income ~. The stock of assets at the beginning
ofperiod t is denoted by Ai, and the interrst rate r is assumed to be known
and time invariant. The budget constraint for period t is
Ait~ - (1 f r)Ai f diwi -F (1 - di)6i f~- c~ (3)
Due to the constraint, choosing (c~, dt) is equivalent to choosing (Ai}i, d~ ).
The choice variables in period t are the state variables for the next period
decision. A different Iabour market state in period t impliesa different level
of wealth Aiti.
. The job offer pracess
Let e~ denote a dummy variable indicating whetheror not a job is offer~ed in
period t:5
et - 1 ifa job offer is received
- 0 ifno job offers are received
Similarly, let f~ denote a dummy variable indicating whether or not a job
offered is acceptable:2
ft - 1 if the job is acceptable
- 0 if not
7'he relationship between transitions, offers and acceptance is summarized
by d~ - e~f~. Throughout it is assumed that e~ is independent ofci, A~tt and
fi. This assumption implies that the transition probability can be written as
the product of an arrival probability and a job acceptance probability. The
job offer arrival probability in period t is given by
E(ci~dt-t) - aé`-' (4)
aa`-' is the probability ofobtaining at least onejob offer in period t., condi-
tional on the labour market state dt-t in the period before. For individuals
with di-t - 1, rri - 1-~i may be interpreted as the probability of being
laid off in period t.
If individuals obtain a job offer, they have to decide whether or not to accept
the offer. In making this decision, they take into account that the current
labour market state affects the next period labour market opportunities, as
the period t~- 1 arrival rate Jt`~t~ depends on d~.
2.2 The Bellman equation
Having specified the utility function, the budget constraint and the arcival
process, we can specify the Bellman equation. The decision process is of a
mixed discrete-continuous type. Conditional on the labour market state d~, the
zlf more than onejob offer is received, thejob with thehighest value determines acceptrnce.6
optimal consumption level . rd t`, or, equivalently, the optimal asset level A~1, can
be determined. Ifa job offer is available, the individual can determine the optimal
labour market state by comparing the conditional value functions (conditional on
labour rnarket state d~) and choosing the labour market state yielding the higher
value. Let [~~`(Aei dt-t) denote the conditional value funcdon, conditional on
labour mazket state dt, and state variables Ai and dt-1:3
Vd' (Ae, de-t) - m~ {u(ce, ds) f QEe~i' (Aett, ~)} subject to (3)
Denote the solution of ct and Attt, conditional on labour market state dt, by
~-t - ~` (Ae, dt-t )
Ad' - Ad` A ett :ft( e,~-t)
(5)
(6)
Then we may write
Va`(Ae, dt-t) - u(cé`, de) f ijEe~i' (Aétt, de) (~)
Using the specification of thejob offer ptncess we can write the expectation at the
right hand side of (7) as
EiV~`i~(Aiti, de) - Ee ~~~1 max ~Vtt(A~t,de) -~tt(A~ t, ~), 0~~}Et~ttÍAétt~ d~)
(g)
2.3 Choice of labour market state
Ifajob offer arrives in period t, i.e if et - 1, then the choice of labour market
state is made by compazing the value functions for the different altematives. The
decision rvle is
dt - 1 if Vt(Aade-t) ~ ~(Ae,dt-i)
- 0 otherwise (9)
'{Note that Ihe value of di-~ does not affact the levd of the value function Vd' (Ai, di-1).
It does, howevu, affect the ~ level of the value fu~tion, conditional on paiod t- 1
information, as arrival rates depend on d~-t,The labour market state affects thc value functions, and consequently the choice
rule, in different ways. First of all it affects cutrent period utility, both directly, as
it appears as an azgument in the utility function,and indirectly, as adifferent labour
market state leads to a different consumption level. Then it affects next period's
value through the wealth variable, and moreover, it affects next period's expected
value through the job offer arrival probability. Differences in arrival rates play a
role in the choice of labour marketstate. Ifthe arrivalrate foremployed individuals
is higher than the arcival rate for nonparticipants, labour market perspectives are
better if you are in the state of employment. This may be an additional incentive
for a nonparticipant to accept a job, as accepting ajob means that you enter the
state with the better perspectives.
Using (9) and the arrival rate, we can specify staying-on and transition proba-
bilities, which we shall denote by B~`-' (At).
eé`-'(Ae) - ~1é`-'P wit(Aade-t) ~ ~(Aadt-t)~ (l~)
The second factor of (l0) is the job offer acceptance probability, which is deter-
mined by randomness in job offer characteristics (e.g. by the wage). lob offer
characteristics are assumed to be independent acrossjob offers.
Blundell, Magnac and Meghir (1994) derive conditions for separate identifi-
cation and estimation of the arrival and Iay-off rates from longitudinal data. The
conditions for the separate identification of arrival and lay-off rates rely on the
assumption that there is nocorrelation across time in unobserved preference ercors.
The estimation method ofHotz and Miller (1993) provides another method to ob-
tain separate estimates for arrival and lay-offrates4. This method also requires the
absence of unobserved randomness that is correlated across time. In the present
paper, theemphasis is on the reduced formestimationoftransition probabilities. In
the application we will check for the presence of individual effects, which causes
correlation across time.
Finally, Blundell, Magnac and Meghir (1994) show that if leisure is a normal
4Bloemen (1994) describes how this method can lx applied to the present model.8
good, there exists a reservation asset level: [fassets at the beginniag ofthe period
are above the reservation asset level, ajob offer will not be acoepted.
2A The Ealer eqnatloa for consumptioa
The Bellman equation (~ can be used to derive the Euler equation for con-
sumption:
~~-~e`,de) -Q~lfr)Ei~~ce~ï,defi) (ll) a~ a~t,
Blundell, Magnac and Meghir(1994) propose to use thisequation as a basis forthe
estimation of the parameters of the utility function. Iob offer arrival and lay-off
rates cannot be identified from this Euler equation.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
The data are drawn from the Dutch Socio Economic Panel (SEP), colltcted
by the CBS. ln the survey, no ditect tneasurc of consumption is available. From
19g7 on, extensive infortnation is availableon various asset aad debt components,
which can be used to construct net total wealth. Infom~ationon assets and debts
is collected on a yearly basis. Alessie, Pradhan and Zandvliet (1993) provide
a descriptive analysis on the various wealth measures in the SEP. Akssie and
Zandvliet (1993) comment on the rneasurement of household saving obtained
from first differencing wealth measures.
The different asset components that are used to calculate total net wealth arc
the balance on savings or deposit account, savings certificates, value of bonds.
stocks and opdons, the value of the own house and other real estate, value ofown
car, amount of money lent and the credit balancx on checking account (positive or
negative). The debt components are debt loan or credit, amount ofhire purchase,
amount of mortgage and other loans and debts. These values aro added up to
obtain total net wealth Ai.9
Alessie and Lusardi ( 1993) meaeure consumption in period t by ci - rAi f
y: - Si, in which A, is net total wealth at the beginning of period t, y~ is income5
in period t, and S~ - DA~t~ is saving in period t. The interest rate r is a.csumed
to be 3QI'o. This value roughly coincides with the value of the real rate of interest
during the period. In the present paper, we basically use the same measure of
consumption. The available data are from 1987 up to 1991. Self-employed and
retired persons are excluded from the sample.
Assets are measured at the household level. The labour market state variable
d~ represents tha labour market state of the head of the household.
The data will be used to estimate the Euler equation and the labour market
transitions model. For the Euler equation, we can only use individuals who are in
the sample for three subsequent periods, due to the first differencing in wealth to
obtain the consumption measure and the first differencing in the Euler equation.
Consquently, we can estimate the Euler equation for three periods.
Tables lA and 1B show the descriptive stadtics of the dataset that is used in
the estimation ofthe Euler equation. The notation in the table coincides with the
notation defined in section 2. The total number of observations is 6373 over 3014
different households. The tables shows the sample mean and standard deviation
of the consumption measure in two subsquent periods, the level of wealth in
thn~ subsquent period, and the change in level of wealth for two periods. The
upper part oftable 1A shows the statistics for the whole sample. The middle and
lower section of the table show the statistics for individuals who are respectively
nonparticipant and employed in the first oftwo subsequent periods of observation.
Employed individuals have higher levels of assets, consumption and savings than
nonparticipants. Table 1B shows the same statistics, but here the sample is split
up with respect to state of destination as well. The first section ofthe table shows
the statistics on nonparticipants who remain nonparticpant in two subsequent
periods. The second section shows nonparticipants experiencing a ttansition into
employment. The third part displays the statistics of employed persons with a
Sln the ncNation of equation (3): gi - d~wi f(t - ái)bi -F l~ilo
transition into nonparticipation, and the fourtó part is on employed persons who
keep theirjob.
For nonparticipant.c who becorne employed in the next period, there is an
increase in the level of savings, which is not observed for individuals who rctnain
nonparticipant, even though the initial level of savings is about the same for the
two subgroups of the sample. For [he employed individuals something similar is
going on. For those who become nonparticipant therc is a decrcase in the level
of saving. Note that nonparticipants who become employed have lower values
of assets than nonparticipants who rem.tin nonpardcipant. Similarly, employed
individuals who become nonparticipant have lower values ofassets than employed
individuals who rcmain employed.
In the estimation of the reduced form transition model, a larger data set is
used, as for this purpose it is sufitcient to observe individuals in two subsequent
periods. Table 2 shows the number of transitions from one period to another that
is observed.
3.2 Estimating the EWer equation
In this section the Euler equation for consumption ( l l) isestimated. Following
Blundell, Magnac and Meghir (1994), we specify a utility function that is quadratic
in consumptiona
1
u(es, de) --2(ce - éd~ - a'zt)2 ( l2)
in which zt is a vector ofexogenous taste shifters, and b and a are parameters to
be estimated. Throughout, we assume the rate of dme preference p to be equal to
the interrst rate rr. The Euler equation (11) becomes:
Ee IDcett - bs,dttt - áOzrtt) - 0 (13)
eNote that we also could have included a second term in the utility function, containing labour
market state, and allowing labour marka state to influence thelevel ofutility withouteffecting the
marginal utility ofconsumption. However, its pararneters are not identified by estimation of the
Euler eyuation for consumption.
~The Euler eyuation has also been estimated with p- 0.01. This did not lead to basically
Jifferent results.11
In the vector z~ of taste shifters we include a dummy variable for marital status,
the log age of head of the household and its square, and the logarithm of the total
number of persons in the household.
The set of inswments includes the elements of ~ziti. This requires the as-
sumption that its elements are known at time t, which is not unlikely, considering
the variables that have been included. Apart from Ozi}~, we need instruments
for the endogeneously determined right hand side variable ~ditl. Various insw-
ments are considered. First of all, there are dummy variables that are related to
expectations about future income of the household and the future financial situa-
tion ofthe household are included. The structural model suggests thatexpectations
with respect to the future play a role. The dummy variable incexpl equals one if
household income is expected to increase in the next l2 months, zero otherwise.
Incexp2 equals one if the income is expected to stay the same. The dummy vari-
able finexpl equals one if the financial situation of the household is expected to
improve in the next 12 months, zero otherwise. Finexp2 equals one if the financial
situation of the household is not expected to change. Apart from these dummy
vaziables, we consider the use of labour market state in period t, di, the sex of the
head of the household, and dummy variables for the level of education. In case of
correlation across time, labour market state in period t may not be exogenous, and
therefore we will estimate the model both with and without d~ as an instrument.
Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1993) pointed out that the (finite sample) properties
of the IV estimator are unfavourable if the additional instruments do not predict
well the endogenous right hand side variable. They show that in that case the IV
estimates tend to the OLS estimates. Consequently, they recommend to report
the F-test for testing the joint significance of the additional instruments in the first
stage regrrssion. First, we ran a first stage regression with instruments Oziti and
finexpl, finexp2, incexpl, incexp2, d~, the sex of the head of the household, and
three dummy variables for the lower thrce levels of education (educl, educ2 and
educ3). The F test statistic for testing the joint significance of finexpl, finexp2,
incexp1, incexp2, di, gender, educ1, educ2 and educ3 is 72.2, which implies rejec-12
tion of the null hypothesis at the 596 level. The t-values of the separate variable.c
nevealed that the dummy educ3 is not significant, the dummy finexp2 is sigificant
at the 1096 level, whereas the remaining additional instruments are significant at
the 596 level. As di may not be exogenous, we also ran the first stage regression
without d~. in that case the F statistic is 1.94 implying that the null hypothesis is
not rejected at the 596 level. On inspection of the t-values ofthe ccefficients, we
found that now only the dummies incexpl, incezp2 are significant. Running a first
stage regression with incexpl and incexp2 as the only additioosl variables yields
a test statistic for testing the joint significance oftheir coefficients of 5.65.
As a consequence of the results of the first stage regression, we dxided to
estimate the Euler using two different inswment sets. The first inswment set
contains Oz~~i, incexpl, incexp2, finexpl, finexp2, d~, gender, educl, educ2 and
educ3. The second set of instruments contains ~zit~, incexpl and incexp2.
The Euler equation in (13) can be estimated by IV (2SI.S). Keane and Runkle
(1992) show how the efficiency of the estimator can be improved if there is
comelation across time in rrsiduals. First, the model can be estimated by 2SLS. The
ccefficient estimates are used to estimate the covariance matrix of the residuals,
containing the covariances across time of the residuals, while maintaining the
assumption of no correlation across individuals. Next, thecholeski decomposition
of the inverse of this covariance matrix is used to transform the model equation
and reestimate the model by IV. The estimator, thus obtained, is efficient, and its
standard errors are consistent, for general forms of dme correlation in residuals.
The estimation results for the two sets of inswments are presented in the first
and second column oftable 3 respectively.
The estimate of parameter ó, the parameter of labour market state, is not
signi6cant. This holds for both of the regressions. This result implies that the
marginal utility of consumption dces not depend on labour market state. Note
however, that this result dces not have any consequences for a reduced form
specification of a model of labour market transitions, based on (7), (g) and (!0).
Thevalue function V still depends on labourmarketstate ifdifferent labourmarketl3
states causedifferent utility levels, ifjob offerarrivalrates are differentfordifferent
labour market states and if incomes are different. For the same reasons, the level
of consumption, determined by (6), may be different, depending on whether one
is employed or not.
At the bottom of table 3, Hansen's test statistic for testing overidentifying
restrictions is presented. For both specifications, the overidendfying restrictions
are not rejected at the 596 level, implying that the validity of the use of di as
instrument is not rejected.
3.3 A reduced form model for transitions
A reduced form model for the transition probabilities in (10) is specified.
Note from ( IO) that wealth at the beginning of the period should be included
as a regressor and note also that the transition probabilities may be different for
different states of origin. Recall that assumptions like leisure being a normal
good (Blundell, Magnac and Meghir (1994)) or decreasing abolute risk aversion
(Danforth(1979)) imply the value ofwealth at the beginningofthe period to have a
negative effect on the probability ofstaying employed or experiencing a transition
from nonparticipation into employment.
As a reduced form for the transition probability ~, we specify
B~ - 4'(k.xe-~),i - 0,1 (14)
in which 4i(.) is the standard normal cumulative density function. ~ represents
the probability of a transition from unemployment to employment. Bi represents
the staying on rate foremployed individuals. Apart from usingthe normal density,
we will also present results obtained with logit. In the vector xi-~we include Ai
and its square. Note that the parameter vector is different for different states of
origin.
The available data contain observations on the period 1987-1991. The total
numberof observationson employed is 7744. 349 transitions from employmentto
nonparticipationoccur. The total numberofobservations among nonparticipants is14
25~3. The observed numberof transitions from nonparticipation intoemployment
is 244.
The included explanatory variables aro, apart from initial wea1W Ai and its
square, a dummy variable formarital status, a dummy indicating whetlter the head
of the household is a male, age and age squared, the education dummies educl,
educ2 and educ3, with educ1 the lowest level ofeducation, educ2 the next to the
lowest level, etc., the total number of persons in the household, tbe cross effocts
of sex of the head of the household with family siu and marital status, and the
dummy variables finexpl, finexp2, incexpl and incxxp2 that have also been used
as inswments in the estimation of the Euler equation. The transition process
describes the transition in labour market state from one period to another and
therefore we also include some explanatory variables that are related to changes
in exogenous variables. We include a dummy variable ~EDUC wttich takes the
value one if the level ofeducation has increased from one period to another, uro
otherwise, and we include the change in family siu from one period to another.
The first column oftable 4 gives the probit estimates of the parameters of the
staying on probability forthe employed. Wealth has a significantpositive effect on
the probability ofstaying employed. The estimated effect of the square of wealth
is negative but insignificant. The results seem to suggest that the higher is the level
of wealth, the higher will be the probability that someone will stay on the job.
This is at variance with the theoretical prediction. The positive significant effect
of wealth on the staying-on probability scems hard to interpn.K. According to the
model in section 2, the effect ofwealth enters the probability through preferences,
in which case the positive effect is a preference efiect. [ndividuals with a higher
preference for working, may have less time to consume and accumulate mort
assets. Another explanation may be that wealth serves as an indicator for other,
unobserved, characteristics: The individuals with the higher wealth may be the
individuals with the better positions and thereforo the lower risk of being laid off.
The likelihood ratio test statistic, for testing the null hypothesis that both
ccefficients of wealth and wealth squan:d are uro, is 16.1, which implies that the15
null hypothesis is rejected at the 5961eve1. Stancanelli (1995) specifies a transition
equation including a spline for initial wealth. She finds a positive effect for lower
values of wealth and a ncgativc cffectfor wealth of higher values, and interprets
this to be a consequence of risk aversion: Only people with high wealth take the
risk not to work. The values of the estimated coefficients of wealth and wealth
squared in table 4 imply that only for individuals with a value of wealth of over
1.35 million guilders, wealth would have a negative inHuence on the staying-on
probability, which is not a relevant number considering the range of wealth values
in the sample.
The effectof maritalstatus is negative and not significant, but thecross effect of
marital status and the head ofthe household being male is positive: Being married
induces male heads of households to work. The estimates of family siu show
something similar: The effect of family siu is negative and significant, and the
cross effect of family siu and male is positive and signíficant: For a male head
of the household having a larger family implies a higher probability ofstaying on,
whereas for a female head of the household the reverse holds. Note that a change
in family siu from one periodto another does not have a significant effect on the
probability ofstaying on. Both the ccefficientsofage and its square are significant
at the 596 level. The esdmates imply that the probability of staying on rises with
age until the age of 38, after which it falls. The two lower level of education
have a negative effect on the probability of staying on. Note that the dummy
variable DEDUC, indicating an increase inthe level ofeducation, has a significant
effect on the probability of staying on. There are two possible explanations for
this effect. Either individuals have quit theirjob as they want to spend their time
searchingforabetterjob which theyexpectto be ableto ónd because of their higher
level of education, or they have increased their level of education as they already
expected to be laid off and wanted to increase their labour market opportunities.
71ie effect of finexpl is positive and significant at the 1096 level and finexp2 is
positive and significant at the 546 IeveL Recall that finexp 1 equals l ifthe financial
situation of the household is expected to improve in the next twelve months, and16
ónexp2 is I if the financial situation is not expecteà to change. These estimates
imply that individuals who expect their financial situation to worsen have a lower
probability ofstaying on. This may indicate that the dummies finexpl and finexp2
are indicators for the rate oflay off and the associated financial consequenoes of
being laid off. We sce something similar for the variables incexpl and incexp2.
Tndividuals who expect that their income will increase in the next twelve months
have the higher probability ofstaying on, while this probability is lowest forpeople
expecting a decreasee.
The second column of table 4 shows the results of the logit estimation. The
same parameters are significantas in the probitspecification, whichisan indication
of robustness.
Table 5 shows the parameter estimates of the transition probabilities for transi-
tions fmm nonparticipation into employment. Thc fint column presents the probit
estimates. Tbe parameter estimate of net wealth is negative but not significant,
whereas the parameter estimate of its squaro is positive and insignificant. The
likelihood ratio test statistic, for testing the null hupothesis that both coefficients
of wealth and wealth squared are uro, is 3.7, and therefore the null hypothesis is
not rejected at the 5961evel. The quadratic effect of wealth dominates for values
ofwealth over 850 thousand guilders.
Age and the square ofagehave asignificanteffect on thetransidon probabilities.
The estimates imply that the probability of a transition from nonparticipation into
employment falls with age after the age of 29. The education dummies have
significant negative effects on the transition probability. The effect of family siu
is negative and not significant, whereas the cross effect of family size and male
is positive and significant. The dummies finexp2 and incexp2 are not significant,
whereas finexpl and incexpt are positive and significant at the 10 and 596 level,
respectively, indicating that people who expect the'u financial situation to improve
in the next twelve months and people who expect their income to increase in the
sTime dummies forthe wave of the panel have bxn included, lwt they hardly had any effects
on the paramaers estimates or their standard urors.17
next twelve months, have a higher probability of a transition into employment.
7'he logit results in the second column are rather similar.
Summarizing we can say that we have found plausible effects of demographic
variables, like family siu, sex of head of the household and age, on the transition
processes. However, the effect ofwealth, which is the mainconcern ofthe pnesent
paper, is not fully in accordance with the implications of economic theory. For
the staying-on process, we find a positive effect of wealth, instead of a negative
effect. On the other hand, the positive effect is in accordance with the estimation
results of Euler equation, which show a negative effect of employment on the
marginal utility of consumption. Apparantly, people with a strong preference for
employment do not have enough time to consume and consequently accumulate
relatively more assets. For transitions from nonparticipadon into employment, we
do find the negative effect of wealth, but the evidence is weak.
Interproting the results in terms of the swctural probability in (l0), the sig-
nificance of net wealth in the staying-on probability implies that the transition
from employment into nonparticipadon depends on wealth, e.g. the probabili-
ty of becoming a nonparticipant is not fully determined by the layoff rate. On
the other hand, the transition probability from nonparticipation into employment
shows a completely different wealth pattern than the staying-on probability, i.e.
negative and insignificant effects ofwealth and its square, respectively. The both
probabilides should be pmportional according to (10), with the artival rates as
proportionality factor. The difference in wealth patterns could be interpreted as
evideac;e against the structural model, but the argument is only valid if the sub-
sample of nonparticipants and the subsample of employed were random samples
from the same population. In practice, this is not likely to be the case. In our
sample, the mean value of net wealth for the subsample of employed is far higher
than for the subsample ofnonparticipants.
In trying to explain the differences in the wealth patterns between the proba-
bilities for employed and nonparticipants, we tried to find out what is the main
cause of the difference in the mean values of wealth for the subsamples of em-18
ployed and nonparticipants. On inspection of the different wealth components,
we found lazge differences in house ownership and mortgages between emptoyed
and nonparticipating persons. The total percentage of house ownership in the
sample is 48.6. For the subsample ofemployed individuals the percentage is 56.2
and for the subsample of the nonparticipants 26.0, which is considerably lower
than for the employed. The mortgage percentages are 44.6 for the whole sample,
53.4 for the subsample of employed individuals and 18.0 for the subsample of
nonparticipating individuals. The differences in net average wealth between the
employed and the nonparticipants is very much affected by the value of the house
and the amount of the mortgage. We reran the probit and logit regressions for
the transition probabilides, including a dummy variable for the presence of the
mortgage.9
The results ofincluding a mortgage dummyarepresented in the third and fourth
column of tables 4 and 5. The inclusion of the dummy has quite some impact.
l.ooking at the results for the staying-on probability in table 4, the effect ofhaving
a mortgage is positive and highly significant. Moreover, the significance of the
assets disappeared and the p-value af the asset parameter estimate has risen to
as much ac 0.73. The reason for the effect probably is that the ownership of a
house with mortgage may be an indicator for long terrn expectations with respect
to the labour market perspectives of the individual. Someone who is employed,
but faces a high risk of lay-off, will not be tempted to buy a house and take a
mortgage. Another possible ezplanation is that individuals with a mortgage need
to work to pay off the mortgage, in which case the positive effect ofthe mortgage
dummy is a pure wealth effect which is perfectly consistent with the prediction of
the economic model. There may also be explanations in terms ofpreferences, e.g.
habit persistence. The insignificance of the wealth parameters estimates, together
with the above explanation, isevidence infavour ofthe exogeneity ofthe transition
probability from employment into nonparticipation, e.g. once one has decided to
work, one is determined to stay at work, and ifone becomes unemployed, it is due
9lncludinga dummy for house ownaship led tosimilar results.19
to lay-off.
In table 5 the results are presented for the nonparticipation to employment
transition probabilities. In both the probit and the logit regression the effect ofthe
mortgage dummy is positive but insignificant at convendonal significance levels.
As a final exercise, we excluded the value ofthe house, as well as the value of
the mortgage from net total wealth, and included them as separate regressors in
the probabilities. The results are given in table 6. The first two columns of table
6 present the parameter estimates of the staying-on probabilities for the probit
and logit regressions respectively. In both regressions, the parameter estimate of
net wealth, with house and mortgage values excluded, is positive and significant
at the 596 level. The parameter estimate of the value of the house is negative,
but insignificant. The parameterestimate ofthe value of the mortgage is posidve
and signi5cant at the 1096 level. Note that in the previous tables the mortgage
was a negative component ofnet wealth. The mortgage dummy is not significant.
Net wealth excluding house and mortgage has a positive effect on the staying-on
probability,whereasthe negative value ofthe mortgage, has a negativeeffectonthe
staying-on probability. Although the prediction of the economic model does not
hold for wealth as a whole, it dces for mortgages. This results may be explained
by relative risk aversion. People with high amounts of debt are less tempted to
quit ajob, than people with lower amounts ofdebt.
Looking at the results forthe transidon probability for non-participants, we see
that the value of the mortgage does not have a significant effect on the transition
probability, wheroas the effect of the remaining assets are not significant either.
In conclusion we can say that splitting up total wealth in housing and remaining
wealth did not lead to different wnclusions about theeffectof wealth on the labour
market transition probabilities.
3.4 A transition model witó random etïects
The estimationresultsofthe transitionprobabilities in the previous subsections,
show a significant positive relation between a.csets and the probability of staying-20
on. This positive relation may be due to the presence of individual specific
unobserved heterogeneity. In this section, we estimate a random effects probit
model to allow for the presence of individual specific random effects. We specify
the following transition equations:
~it - ~exii ~(Y~ t u,i if d;,;-; - 1
~- rc;,xci t~; t ui if d;,i-~ - 0 (15)
d;; - e(fiu ~ 0), l- e,u
The disturbance tenns u~ and u ~ are assumed to be independently normally
distributed across time and across individuals with their variances non:ttalized to
one.
At first sight, the estimation of model ( IS) under the assumption of nonnally
distributed random effects seems to be straightforward. However, several compli-
cations arise:
. The transition equations are conditional on the labour market state in the
period before, d;,;-1. Consequently, an initial condition for the first period
of observation needs to be specified.
. The vector xu contains the lagged endogenous variable A;i, which is likely
to be correlated with o'; and cr~. A common approach in the literature is
to impose a correlation structure of the form (Chamberlain (1980, 1984),
Mundlak (1961)):
- rlÁ; -H r2Á? f v; (16)
riÁ;-Fr~Á; ~v~ (17)





. A problem with the approach above is that Á; contains A;,it~ which in
turn is likely to be correlated with u,~ and u~ in (15). The correlation will21
disappear asymptotically if the number of time periods T tends to infinity.
In the present application, the number of time periods clearly is too small
to ignore the possible correlation. Nickell (1981) calculates the asymptotic
bias that arises for fixed T and N--i oo in case ofthe linearrandom effects
model.
~ As a consequence of the items above, an appropriate way to deal with the
problem is to specify a simultaneous model for assets and labour market
transidons, with random effects including initial conditions.
Before implementing a simultaneous model of assets and labour market tran-
sitions, it scems wise first to esiimate the ad hoc specification in equations (15)
through (19).
The identification of the covariance o~„ in (18) depends on the availability of
observations on multiple transitions of the same individual. These observations




If the random effects are individual specific, and not labour market specific, this
restriction is not unrealistic. The parameter r3 allows for differences in scale
effects and direction.
An initial condidon, explaining the Iabotu market state in the first period of
observation, is added to the model and it is specified as
d;o - Q~ozio f ó; (21)
We may impose the following swcture on ó; and v;:
`v~I NN"fiI~` ~ a~Il
(22)
~o-tT~e motlel also t~as lxtn atimated without this restriMions: The cortelationcaefficientofthe
aror tams tookthe value -0.99.22
Table 7 presents the ML estimation results. Wealth Au now has a negative
effect on the staying-on probability, which is significant at the 596 level. The
positive effect that we found in the previous speciócations has been picked up by
the mean assets Á;, which has a significant positive effect on the probability of
staying-on.
The results in the third and fourth column of table 7 show that the negative
effect of assets on the transition from nonparticipation into employment, for which
the evidence is rather weak ín the previous specifications, is much stronger now,
whereas the mean of assets has a significant positive effect on the transition
probability.
The lower part oftable 7 displays theestimates and standard errorsofthe initial
condition, explaining labour mazket state in the first period. Individuals with a
higher average level of assets have a higher probability of being employed. The
dummies for the various levels ofeducation add significantly to the explanation
of being in a given labour market state. Individuals with the lower two levels of
education have a significantly lower probability of being employed.
Finally, the estimated covarianc;e between the error of the initial condition and
the random effect, a~, is positive and significant at the 596 level. The correlation
ccefficient between the random effect and the initial condition, defined as the ratio
between ~,.~ and a~, is 0.19, with a standazd error of 0.08.
Note that the parameter r~, which measures the impact of the randomeffect on
the transition from nonparticipation into employment, is significantly negative. At
first sight, this may appear strange, as the implication is that people with a higher
probability of becoming employed also have a higher probability of becoming
unemployed. It may reflect that individuals with a strong preference towards
employment are willing to accept a job, even if the risk of being laid off is high.
The strong significance of inean assets implies that individual specific effects
that are persistent over time seem to play an important role in the explanation of
the relation between labour market transtions and wealth. Recalling the ad hoc
character of the method employed, the results provide sufficient motivation for23
the specification of a simultaneous model of Iabour market transitions and wealth,
allowing for the possible comlation betwcen wealth and the random effects.
3.5 A simultaneous reduced form model of wealtó and labour
market transitions with random ef[ects
In the previous section, we estimated a model of labour market transitions
with random effects, using the Chamberlain (1985) specification to wmct for
possible comlation betwcen lagged wealth and the random effect. This method
yields inconsistent estimates if the number of time periods observed is fixed. In
this section, we specify a simultaneous madel for the choice of assets and labour
market restrictions, in order to allow for a mor~e proper treatment of comlation
betwcen assets and random effects. 7itroughout, we maintain the assumption
that Iabour market transitions exhibit random effects, as the estimation results of
the previous model support the pre,sence of random effects. In addition to the
transition equation, an equation explaining the amount of assets in a given period
needs to be specified. Various approachescan be followed. One way to proceed is
to explain the level of assets from a set of explanatory variables, like age, level of
education, family siu, etc. Another possibility is to interpret the asset equation as
a reduced form equation for the policy function in (6). Then the choice of assets
at the end of period t depends on the level of assets at the beginning of period
t, and consequently lagged assets should be included an explanatory variable ac
well. Morevover, the choice of assets in period t will, in general, be different if
the Iabour maiicet state dt in period t is different. If utility specification (12) is
chosen, it can be shown that the solution for net total assets in period t is
-, 1




~étï - ~ [ódet. f áztts~ (~)
Ué~ï - de}.w~t. f~1 - dtts~beta f {kts (25)24
and
T-t j ~
~ - ~1 t ~{(1 f r)Q}-'J- (26)
e-1
with ~i - Q(1-1- r). From (23) it can easily be seen how labour market state affects
the choice of assets. First of all, the labour market state influences the asset level
through current income y~. In general, income is lower for unemployed pcrsons
than foremployed persons. Secondly, labourmarket stateaffects the currentperiod
marginal utility level of consumption, which effectenters (23) by w~. Thirdly, as
today's labour market state determines next period'sjob offers through the arríval
rate, labour market state affects future expectations of income as wel! as marginal
utility ofconsumption.
In specifying a reduced fonm model for the choice ofassets, the dependence of
choice ofassets on labour market state needs to be incorporated. A linearequation
for assets is specified. We allow for correlation between the disturbance terms of
the transition process and the asset equation. Moreover, the slope coefficients of
the covariates in the asset equation, are allowed to bedifferent for differentchoices
ofthe labourmarketstate. or, equivalently, cross effectsbetween the covariates and
Iabour market state are included in the asset equation. The joint model becomes:
K~xu f ái f tL~i If d~,t-~ - 1
~c;,xu t a; -F uu ifd;,t-~ - 0
c(~ ~ 0)
rl~m;; f l; t vu if d;t 1 0






First of all we will say something about the explanatory variables to be included
in the vectors m;t and x;t. Thereafter we will comment on the error swcture of
the equations and the specification of initial conditions.
If we as.cume that equations (30) and (31) correspond with equation (6) in the
structural model, then assets one period lagged should be included in the vector
of explanatory variables m;t: We include both A;t and A~. Like before, they25
are also included in the vector of ezplanatory variables of the transidon process.
Note that equation (23) suggest.e that the vector m;i should include income in
period t. The income process will be correlated with the transition process. 7i~is
implies that, apart from the asset and transition equations, two income equations
for the income pracesses of the two Iabour market states should be included. We
will assume throughout that the income processes can be represented by linear
equations, which have already been substituted in (30) and (31). Consequently,
theerror terms in (30) and (31) include randomness in the income proxss, andthe
random effect may also repn.sent persistence in income.
An initial condition for initial assets and labour market state hasto be specified:
~o - ~z;o -F Á: (32)
Au - nóq;o t r; (33)
d:o - i(d,o ~ fl) (34)
Finally, the correlation structure between the disturbance termsofthe differont
equations needs to be specified. It is assumed that (vu, uu, uu) is independent-
ly and identically distributed across time and across individuals. The vector
(a„cr;, l;, b;, r;) is assumed to be independent and identically distributed across
individuals. Its elements may be correlated. The two vectors (vu, uu, ufi) and
(a,, o~;,!;, b;, r,) are assumed to be independent.
The specification captures the possible correlation between assets and random
effects in two ways: First, the random effect in the asset equation !; is allowed to
be correlated with the random effect in the transition equation, o'; . Second, initial
assets are allowed to be correlated with the randomeffect ofthe transition process.
If the parameter of lagged assets in the asset equation is equal to one, and the
parameter oflagged assets squared is equal to zero, these two types of comelation
cannot be identidied separately, as the influence of the initial state will persist. In
that particular case it is unlikely thatthe conditional asset equation(conditional on
lagged assets) contains a random effect, as a random effect in the level of assets
is differenced out. Then the random effect may be ezcluded from the equation,26
which means that the correlatíon across time runs endrely through initial assets.
An alternative to solve this identification problem may be to spxify a marginal
asset equation with random effects, in which case lagged assets are not included
in (30) and (31). In that case, there is no need to specify a separate equation for
inidal a.xcets. Although the first ultennative of maintaining the conditional asset
specification and exluding random effects, is nested in the complete specification
described above, the second approach of specifying a marginal asset equation
is not. Moreover, the marginal assets equatlon does not have a direct economic
interpretation as a poliryfunction. However, this alternative approachmaybemore
suitable for thepurpose ofcotrecting forpossiblecotnlationbetwcen Iaggedassets
in the transition equation with the random effect, as it allows for the cotrelation
of the Igvy~ of assets with the random effects, whereas in the first approach the
emphasis is on the period to period change in the level.
A similar assumpdon as in (20) is made with respect to the relation betwcen a;
and cr;:
T u e a; - -a;
oe
The vectors ofdisturbances are assunted to follow a normal distribution.
vu 0 0~ o~, o,,,,
uu ~ N 0 , oe„ 1 s
uu 0 ( o,,,, s 1
(35)
(36)
The variances of u i and uu have bcen normalized to one, and the cotrelation
between u;~ and u~ is not defined, as one cannot be in two muwally exclusive
labour market states at the same time.
o; 0 0~ o~ o~
l; N N 0 0~ oi ou
é; 0 ' o~ o~ 1
r; 0 oe, oi, 0,6
(37)
The variance of ó; has been normalized to one. The parameter od measures the
correlation across time between labour marlcet state and assets. The parameters
~~ and o~, rofer to the covariance between labour market state in any period andz7
the initial labour market state, and the covariance between labour market state in
any period and initial assets. The parameters aió and air refer to the covariunce
across time between assets and the initial labour market state, and as.sets and initial
assets. Finally, rr,á refers to the correlation between initial a.~.sets and the initial
labour market state. All these covariances can be linked to observables and are, at
least theoretically, identified.
An attempt hac been made to estimate the full model in (27)-(37), with lagged
assets and lagged a.s~ets squared included as explanatory variables in the vector m;i
of the assets equation. It turned out that thecceffient of lagged assets approached I
and the ccefficient of lagged assets squared approached zero. Ifthere is a random
effect in the level of a.csets, the random effect will not appear in the conditional
a.tiset equation at the.5e values of ccefficients. Apart from that, as mentioned
before, the random effect cannot be disentangled from the effect of initial a.~.tiets.
Therefore we have to switch to the two alternatives described above. The tint
alternative means that the random effect 1; is excluded from the assets equation.
The random vector in (37) becomes three dimensional, and the row and column
corresponding with l; disppear from the covariance matrix.
Table 8 presents the estimation results. Table 8A shows the estimation results
of the transition equation. Compared with the simple specification for the staying-
on probability in table 4, not much has changed. The ccefficient of a.`sets in the
staying-on equation is significantly positive at the 596 level, while the ccefficient
of the quadratic term is insignificant. The estimates of the age ccefficients are
significant. The probability of staying-on rises with age until the age of 37,
after which it falls. The education dummy for the second level of education is
significant and negative, and this is in accordance with the random effects model
in table 7. The dummy indicator for the increase in education level (DEDUC)
has a significant negative effect on the probability of staying-on. The effects of
wealth in the transition from nonparticipation into employment are similar to the
results for the simple probit model in table 5. The estimated of the coefficients
are not significant. The dummy for the increase in education level is negative and28
significant. Table 8B shows the rrsults for the assets equation. We considered
the inclusion ofthe dummy variables for income and financial expectations in the
next twelve months. Some first regressions showed that these dummy variables do
not have signi6cant effects on assets ifcross effects betwcen explanatory variables
and labour market state are included, lilce in (30) and (31). Thereforo, we do not
include them in the estimation of the simultaneous model. For bothemployed and
unemployed individuals, the effect of lagged assets in close to, but significantly
larger than one, and the effectof assets squared is close tobut significantly smaller
than uro. The age ccefficients are not significantly different from uro. Equation
(23), in which parameter ~ depends on the time horizon, suggests the inclusion
of cross effects of age with all variables. Including these cross effects did not
lead to significant coefficient estímates, so the results presented here are without
any cross effects. Family siu has a posidve effect for nonparticipants, but not
for employed. The education dummies are significantly negative for both labour
market states, which implies that the highest (reference) level of education has a
positive effect on assets. A monotonous order of the effect of the education level
for the lower thrce levels of education cannot be detected. làble 8C displays the
results for the initial assets equation (33). Cross effects for labour market state
have been incorporated, hence the two seperate columns for the various labour
market states.
In the equation for inidal assets cross etiects with age have a significant effect
for some variables. A higher level of education leads to a higher stock of assets
and the difference in as.ret levelsbetween various levels ofeducation increase with
age. Ttte latter result is consistent with the results of the asset equation in table
86, which imply that the stock of assets grows more than proportionally. The
cross effect of family siu and age has a positive and significant effect, both for
employed persons and for nonparlicipants.
The second part of table 8D show. the estimates of the covariance structure.
The covariance parameters a~„ and ~r,,,, (sce equation (36)), which are the contem-
poraneous covariances between the assets equation and the transition equations,29
are not significandy different from zero. The ccefficient a,. of the random effect
in the staying on probability is significantly different from zero. The parameter T
is significandy negative. These results are similar to the random effects model in
table 7. The parameters oó and o~, which denote the covariance between the ran-
dom effect and the initial conditions oflabour market state and a~.sets respectively,
are not significantly different from zero. This is at variance with the assumption
that wealth contains a random individual effect that is correlated with the random
effect ifthc labour market transition equations. The covariance oTá, between initial
labour maket state and initial assets, is positive and significant. The correlation
ccefficient, defined as the ratio between oró and or, is equal to 0.77.
Concluding wecan say that sofar theattempts of a more sophisticatedtreatment
of the ad hoc random effect.c model of section 3A and table 7 failed to generate
the same results.
The alternative approach excludes lagged acsets A,~ and lagged a.s.sets squared
A~ from the vector ofexplanatory v:uiables m;i in (30) and (31). Thus we obtain
an equation explaining the levcl of atisets, and by including the random cffect l„
we can impose correlation between the random effect in the level of assets and the
random effect rri in the labourmarket transition equations, thereby formalizing the
ad hoc correlation structure (16) and (17). [f lagged a.~.~ets are not included in the
assets equation, the separate equation for initial ati~ets (33) becomes superFluous,
as for assets A;i the specification (30) and (31) can be used. !n the equation (37),
r, is replaced with v,a, which is correlated with the initial labour market state, twt
uncorrelated with random effects, so a~T - o!r - 0 and ors - o~b, ~. -~~-
The estimation results are presented in table 9. Table 9A contains the esti-
mates of the transition equation. Lagged assets has a positive significant effect on
the probability of staying-on. The ccefficient estimate of lagged assets squared
is negative. The combination of both estimates implies that the effect of assets
becomes negative for asset values of over 719000 or more, which is outside the
relevant sample range. Surprisingly, the ccefficient estimate of lagged a.~.sets in
the probubility of transition from nonparticipation into employment ha~ become30
positive and significanl as well, and the effect of lagged assets squan~ is signifi-
cantly negatlve. These estimates imply that the effect of assets becomes negative
for assets values of over 359000 guilders. So forboth the probability ofbecoming
employed and the probability of staying employed the effect of assets is positíve.
At this point, it seems worthwhile to look at the influence ofthe random effects,
by looking at the estimates of the covariance structure, displayed in table 9C. The
estimate of the covariance parameter a~, which is the covariance betwcen the
random effect in the staying-on equation and the level of assets, is negative and
significant, implying that on average, staying employed is negatively correlated
with the level of assets. Note that this is exactly the opposite result of the ad
hoc random effects model of table 7, in which mean assets had a positive effect
and the level of assets itself a negative effect. Note that the estimate of the
scale parameter r, measuring the impact of the random effect on the transition
from nonparticipation into employment, is positive now, implying that the random
effect in the equation of becoming employed is negatively cornlated with the
random effect in the level of assets as well. The cornlation ccefficient, obtained
by dividing a~ by the product of o~ and oi, is -0.95. Its standazd enor is 0.29.
Note also that the estimates of the contemporaneous covariances a~„ and v,,,, are
negative and significant. The respective correlation ccefficients are -0.38 and
-0.80, with standard errors 0.003 and 0.003.
So far we may conclude that assets themselves have a positive effect on the
probability of staying or becoming employed, but that there is a strong negative
correlation in the unobserved components of assets and these probabilities. The
question that remains to be answered is what causes the difference in the results
obtained with the ad hoc model oftable 7 and the present model. The staying-on
equation in table 7 includes the expression -0.053A;~ ~i- 0.070Á;. This can be
rewritten as 0.017A;~ - 0.0T0(A;, - Á;). Now it may very well bc that the second
term serves as a"residual" ofthe asset equation. Note that the ccefficient of0.017
is remarkably close to the ccefficent of 0.0165 in table 8A. A similar explanation
cannot be given for the transition from nonparticipation into employment, as the31
ncgativc clTccl of as.u;ts is too largc thcro.
Fínally, note that the covariances between random effects artd the initial con-
dition for labour market statc are significant. There is a positive relation between
initially being employed and the random effect in the transition equations, where-
as there is a negative relation between initial labour market state and the random
effect in the asset equation. The covariance between initial labour market state
and the initial level of a.s.sets, o„~, is negative.
Table 96 shows the results of the aeset equation. As opposed to the model in
table 8, which contained lagged assets as an explanatory variable in the asset eyua-
tion, cross effects between age and other explanatory variables play an important
role. The effect of marital status on the level of assets is positive and growing with
age. A similar effect is found for family size. Individuals with the lower three
level of education have lower levels of assets than people with the highest level of
education and the gap is growing with age. Until the age of 40, the level of a.titiets
is on average higher ifthe head of the household is a male.
3.6 Simulations
ln order to evaluate and compare the various transition models, a Monte Carlo
experiment has been run, in which the next period's labour market state has heen
simulated, conditional on the current labour market state. Random numben for
the transition process have been drawn, conditional on the labour market state
and value of assets in the previous period, and the latent variable rCu has been
simulated, which, in turn, establishcs a simulated value ford;~. In the experiment
I OllO replications have been used.
Table 10 provides an overview of the resutts, split up according to current
labour market state and to the model employed. The first models simulated were
lhc simplc probit and logit mcxlel from tables 4 and 5. Ifthe current labour market
state is employment, we see that the simple probit model managcs well to predict
the event of staying-on. About 9696 of the individuals who stay employcd is on
average predicted correctly. The prediction of individuals with a transition into32
nonparticipation is rather poor: only 1896 is predicted correctly. This difference is
dueto the relative low number of observations experiencing a transition. Note that
there is hardlyany difference betwcen the simple probit andthe simple logitmodel.
Ifthe ad hoc random effects model (table 7) is used, there is a slight improvement
of almost 396 in the pn:diction of observations experiencing a transition. The
simultaneous model, in which lagged assetsare included in theassetequation(table
8), yields about the same predictions as simple probit. For the simultaneous model
from table 9 the percentage correct predictions of individuals staying employed
is comparable to the simplez probit model. However, the percentage of correct
predictions of people experiencing a transition is almost 53ó higher.
Looking at the results ifthe current labour market state is nonparticipation, we
sce some similaz patterns. There is hardly any difference in the performance of
simple probit and simple logit. The event of staying nonparticipant is predicted
corcectly for 92.396 of the observations, whereas predictions into employment are
predicted correctly in only 26.696 of the cases. For thead hoc random effectsmod-
el, these numbers are 93.796 and 22.296 respectively, implying that for this model
transitions into employmentare pn:dicted slightly worse. Again, the simultaneous
model with lagged assets in the asset equation (table 8) does not predict better
than simple probit. Looking at the predictions of the simultaneous model from
table 9, we see some shifts in the numbers. Compared to the simple probit model
the percentage ofcorrect predictionsof individuals who remain nonparticipant has
decreased with 3.6Rb to almost 89~0. On the other hand, there is an improvement
in the prediction oftransitionsof 1096, such that thecotrectly predicted percentage
of transitions is over 37 now.
The results of the Monte Carlo experiment show that the transition process for
the employed is predicted best by the simultaneous model that excludes lagged
assets from the asset equation and corrects for correlation betwcen lagged assets
and the random effect in the transition equation. For the transition process for
nonpariicipants, this model does not perform monotonously better. Transitions
into employment are predicted better by this model than by the remaining models,33
but observations on individuals remaining nonparticipanl are less well predicted.
However, the improvement in percentages in the prediction of movers is higher
than the decreasc in percentages in the prediction of stayers. Therefore, we may
conclude that the simultaneous modelling of assets and labour market transitions
leads to an improvement in predictions.
4 Conclusions
A model of wealth and labour market transitions has bcen formulated. Labour
market state affect.c saving basically in thrce ways. First, a different labour market
state usually implies a different level of income. Income ententhe model through
the budget constraint. A labour market tnu~sition cause.e a change in income and
consequently affects the choice of savings. Second, there may be differences in
job offer arrival rates between differenl labour market states. The :urival rates
play a role in the calculation of the dsicounted sum of expected future utility,
and therefore, differences in arrival rates imply differences in future uncertainty.
Moreover, differences in arrival rates between individuals within the same state
play a role. An individual with a low arrival rate in lhe state of nonparticipation,
expects that a spell of unemployment is going to persist for some time, and
consequently, his income will be low for sometime. Third, labourmarket state may
affect thechoice of saving through itseffecton the marginal utility ofconsumption.
The model generates an Euler equation of consumption that can be used to
estimate the structural parameters of the utility function. The estimation results
show that no significant effect of labour market state on the marginal utility of
consumption can be detected.
Under plausible a~.sumptions, economic theory implies the level of a~.tiets to
have a negative influence on the probability of staying or becoming employcd in
the next period. Various reduced form models of labour market transitions have
been estimated to study the effect of wealth on labour market transitions.
Starting with a binary choice model without correlation across time, wealth is34
found to have a positive effect on the probability of staying employed, whereas
there is weak evidence for a negative effect of wealth on the probability of a
transition from nonparticipation into employment.
Splitting up net total wealth into financial wealth, excluding house and mort-
gage, and the value of the house and the value of the mortgage, dces not lead to
different conclusions. Net financial wealth still has a significant positive effect
on the staying-on probability. The value of the mortgage, however, dces have a
positive effect on the probability ofstaying employed, which is in accordance with
the economic predictions. Net total wealth, excluding house and mortgage, has
a negative but insignificant effect on the transition probability from nonparticipa-
tion into employment. The value of the mortgage, however, has an interpretable
significant positive effect on the transition probability.
Next, various transition models allowing for random effects have been esti-
mated. The positive effect of wealth on the probability of staying employed
may be caused by the role of assets as an indicator for unobserved heterogeneity.
People with higher assets may be the people in the better positions with the lower
probability ofbeing laidoff. Moreover, there may be heterogeneity in preferences.
First, a random effects model has been estimated in which for each individual
the mean of assets over time has been included as an explanatory variable, in order
to allow for correlation between the level of assets and the random effect. The
results show that now assets do have a negative effect on the probability of both
staying and remaining employed. The positive effect found before is explained
by the mean level of assets. The estimation method of this random effect model
is inconsistent for a small number of time periods. Therefore, a model which
simultaneously explains assets and labour market transitions is specified to allow
for correl:uion between lagged assets in the asset equation and the random effect
in the transition equations.
In the estimation, we are hampered by the high persistence in asse[s. Including
lagged assets in the asset equation yields a ccefficient estimate that is close to,
although significantly different from, one. Estimating a model with lagged assets35
in the asset equation makes it impossible to identifyrandom effects from the impuct
of initial conditions. Consequently, two specificatiom of a simultaneous model
are estimated. 7'he first model contains lagged assets, which is consistent with the
economic model in (6). However, random effect.s are excluded from the equation
and the correlation between assets and the random effect in the transition equation
completely runs through the effect of initial assets. The second specification
excludes lagged assets from the asset equation, and a random effect is included,
allowing for the direct imposition of correlation betwcen random effects in the
level of a.csels and in labour market transitons.
The first model completely fails to generate better results than the simple probit
specification. The second specification shows that the level of lagged assets now
has a positive effect on both the probability of staying and the probubility of
becoming employed. There is a significant negative wrrelation in the unobserved
components (both random effect and transitory component) of assets and the
probabilities ofstaying and becoming employed. Moreover, the variance in assets
that is due to the random effect is far higher than the variance that is due to the
transitory component. This is moro or less the opposite resultofthe random effects
model with the mean ofassets as explanatory variable. Monte Carlo rrsults show
that the simultaneous model predicts better than the remaining models.
In conclusion we may say that the evidence ofa positive effect ofassets on the
probability of staying on is fairtyrobust over thevarious specificationsconsidered.
Forthe probability ofa transition from nonparticpation intoemployment the results
are mixed. ln the simpler specifications, there is weak evidence in favour of a
negative effect of the amount of assets on the probability of becoming employed.
In the joint models of assets and transitions that allows for individual effects, the
effect is positive.36
TABLE lA: DATA EULER EQUATION: SAMPLE STATISTICS
number of observations: 6373
variable ntean (guilders and guilderslyear) standard deviation
c, 28014.07 34973.87
c,t, 30081.60 32653.81





SAMPLE STATISTICS BY LABOUR MARKET STATE
d, - 0, number of observations: 1523








d, - 1, number of observations: 4850






S~ 7376.72 3217 L22
S~t, 7S8S.16 31738.7737
TABLE 1B: DATA EULER EQUATION: SAMPLE STATLSTICS
SAMPLE STATISTICS BY LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS
d, - 0, rir~~ - 0, number ofobservations:1390








rlr - 0, rlr.f ~ - 1, number ofobservations: I 33
variable mean (guilden and guilderslyear) standard deviation
r:r I 8803.07 I2854.47




Sr I 544.16 11702.50
S~t~ 6125.17 19808.12
rlr - 1, rlr~i - 0, number of observations:219








dr - 1, dr}i- 1, number of observations:4631












observations with dt-~ - 0 2329 244 2573
observations with dt-~ - 1 349 7395 7744






















test for overidentifying restrictions























TABLE 4 THE STAYING-ON PROBABILITY





























































































































































































TABLE 5 THE TRANSTTION PROBABILITY
FROM NONPARTICIPATION INTO EMPLOYII~NT
(standard ermrs in parentheses)
variable Probit Logit Probit Logit
IIVTERCEPT -1.78 -3.66 -1.73 -3.55
(0.47) (0.90) (0.48) (0.91)
A~~10' -0.017 -0.033 -0.0083 -0.O18
(0.011) (0.026) (0.011) (0.024)
(A~~10")2 0.00010 0.00012 -0.0044 -0.0080
(0.00022) (0.00073) (0.0038) (0.0075)
AGE 0.082 0.18 0.079 0.18
(0.024) (0.05) (0.025) (0.05)
SQUARE OF AGE -0.OOl4 -0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0031
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006)
FAMILY SIZE -0.060 -0.12 -0.058 -0.12
(0.067) (0.13) (0.067) (0.13)
FAM. SIZE } MALE 0.20 0.39 0.20 0.39
(0.08) (0.16) (0.08) (0.(6)
EDUCI -0.40 -0.67 -0.40 -0.68
(0.14) (0.26) (0.14) (0.26)
EDUC2 -0.45 -0.82 -0.45 -0.84
(0.14) (0.26) (0.14) (0.27)
EDUC3 -0.38 -0.65 -0.39 -0.68
(0.13) (0.24) (0.13) (0.24)
MALE -0.17 -0.36 -0.16 -0.31
(0.17) (0.31) (0.17) (0.32)
MARiTAL STATUS -0.18 -0.36 -0.I8 -0.37
(0.39) (0.77) (0.39) (0.77)
MAR. STAT.'MALE -0.05 0.13 -0.06 -0.13
(0.42) (0.82) (0.42) (0.83)
DEDUC -0.13 -0.22 -0.12 -0.22
(0.17) (0.32) (0.17) (0.32)
~FAM.SIZE -0.14 -0.28 -0.14 -0.28
(0.10) (0.17) (0.10) (0.17)
OFAM.SIZE~`MALE 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.17
(0.14) (0.25) (0.14) (0.25)
FINEXPI 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45
(O.t7) (0.31) (0.17) (0.31)
FINEXP2 -0.06 -0.18 -0.06 -0.18
(0.13) (0.25) (0.13) (0.25)
INCEXP1 0.57 1.11 0.58 1.I 1
(0.18) (0.33) (0.18) (0.33)
INCEXP2 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.16
(0.14) (0.26) (0.16) (0.26)
MORTGAGE - - 0.08 0.12
(0.14) (0.26)4l
TABLE 6 NET WEALTH WITHOUT HOUSING"






variable Probit Logit Probit Logit
INTERCEPT -2.90 -6.13 -1.74 -3.64
(0.42) (0.83) (0.49) (0.92)
A~ 0.035 0.071 -0.013 0.077
(house :uid mortgage excl.) (0.015) (0.030) (0.040) (0.076)
A~ 0.00018 0.00040 -0.0056 -0.012
(house and mortgage excl.) (O.OOOS I) (0.0010) (0.0056) (0.01 I )
AGE 0.21 0.42 0.079 0.18
(0.02) (0.04) (0.025) (O.OS)
SQUARE OF AGE -0.0028 -0.0060 -0.0014 -0.0031
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006)
FAMILY SIZE -0.23 -0.44 -0.OSB -0.1 I
(0.08) (O.IS) (0.067) (0.13)
FAM. S[ZE s MALE 0.20 0.41 0.20 0.38
(0.08) (0.16) (0.08) (0.16)
EDUCI -0.12 -0.18 -0.39 -0.66
(0.09) (0.21) (0.14) (0.27)
EDUC2 -0.14 -0.1S -0.44 -0.84
(0.10) (0.19) (O.14) (0.27)
EDUC3 0.03 0.14 -0.38 -0.68
(0.08) (0.17) (0.13) (0.24)
MALE -0.09 -0.25 -0.16 -0.30
(0.16) (0.31) (0.17) (0.32)
MARITAL STATUS -0.61 -1.19 -0.18 -0.39
(0.38) (0.71) (0.39) (0.77)
MAR. STAT.'MALE 0.94 1.79 -0.069 -0.IS
(0.40) (0.74) (0.42) (0.83)
DEDUC -0.26 -0.S I -0.11 A.21
(0.10) (0.20) (0.17) (0.33)
OFAM.SIZE 0.007 0.04 -0.13 -0.2R
(0.13) (0.23) (0.10) (0.17)
OFAM.SIZE'MALE -0.04 -0.II 0.07 0.17
(0.14) (0.26) (0.14) (0.25)42
TABLE 6 NET WEALTH WITHOUT HOUSING (contlnued)






variable Probit Logit Probit Logit
MORTGAGE DUMMY -0.07 -0.13 -0.10 -0.41
(0.16) (0.33) (0.30) ' (0.62)
VALUE OWN HOUSE 0.00043 0.0062 -0.018 -0.032
(0.012) (0.024) (0.025) (0.050)
VALUE MORTGAGE 0.045 0.10 0.082 0.17
(0.027) (0.059) (0.056) (0.11)
VALUE HOUSE SQUARED 0.000024 0.00016 0.0010 0.0018
(0.00034) (0.00070) (0.0009) (0.0017)
VALUE MORT. SQUARED -0.0019 -0.0025 0.0029 0.0040
(0.0015) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0080)
VAL. MORT.'VAL. HOUSE 0.0011 0.00067 -0.0059 -0.010
(0.0013) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0078)
Ai'VAL. HOUSE -0.0011 -0.0025 0.0015 0.0020
(0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0041) (0.0085)
At'VAL. MORTGAGE 0.00033 0.0014 -0.0041 -0.0056
(0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0095) (0.019)
FINEXP I 0.22 0.42 0.29 0.45
(0.12) (0.24) (0.18) (0.32)
FINEXP2 0.29 0.58 -0.OS -0.16
(0.10) (0.20) (0.13) (0.25)
INCEXPI 0.87 1.74 0.57 I.13
(O.ll) (0.25) (0.18) (0.33)
INCEXP2 0.65 1.25 0.04 0.16
(0.10) (0.20) (0.14) (0.26)
~~All a~set and debt cromponents have been norm:diucl by dividing by l0a43
TABLE 7 THE RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL
variable estimate standard error estimate standard error
STAYING-ON PROBABILITY NONPART. -i EMPL.
INTERCEPT -3.66 0.58 - I .81 0.68
Au~10" -0.053 0.026 -0.111 0.032
(A;i~10" )1 0.00030 0.00050 0.0007 0.0012
AGE 0.27 0.03 0.072 0.036
AGEZ -0.0037 0.0004 -0.0014 0.0005
FAMILY SIZE -0.24 0.09 -0.049 0.092
FAMILY SIZE' MALE 0.20 0.10 0.19 0.1 1
EDUC I -0.23 0.12 -0.33 0. l 8
EDUC2 -0.23 0.11 -0.46 0.19
EDUC3 -0.010 0.10 -0.42 0.16
MALE -0.006 0.19 -0.14 0.24
MARITAL STATUS -0.57 0.50 -0.39 0.68
MAR. STAT. "` MALE 0.99 0.52 0.10 0.69
DEDUC -0.43 O.ll -0.23 0.17
OFAM.S[ZE 0.08 0.17 -0.13 0.14
OFAM.SIZE'MALE -0.14 0.18 0.11 0.19
Á;~10" 0.070 0.027 0.089 0.037
(Á;~ 10")1 -0.00034 0.00058 -0.00062 0.0016
FINEXPI 0.26 0.14 0.28 0.23
FINEXP2 0.34 O.12 -0.05 O.IB
INCEXP 1 0.90 0. l5 0.64 0.24
INCEXP2 0.71 0.13 -0.001 0.1844
TABLE 7 (coatinued)












































TABLE HA THE JOINT MODEL: PROBABILITIES
STAYING-ON
PROBABILITY










































































































TABLE 8B THE JOINT MODEL: THE ASSET EQUATION
EMPLOYED NONPARTICIPANTS
parametervector rl~ parametervector n„
variable estimate st. err. estimate st. err.
INTERCEPT 0.213 0.747 0.848 1.681
Ai~10' 1.030 O.OOÓ 1.048 0.016
(Ae~10')~ -0.00058 0.00011 -0.0015 0.0003
AGE 0.023 0.037 -0.042 0.073
AGE2 -0.00014 0.00044 O.OOOGO 0.00076
FAMILY SIZE 0.031 0.032 0.188 0.060
EDUC1 -0.498 0. l24 -0.693 0.241
EDUC2 -0.501 0.113 -0.461 0.237
EDUC3 -0.373 0.073 -0.574 0.219
MALE 0.039 0.171 0.029 0.287
MARITAL STATUS -0.040 0.120 -0.146 0.28147





variable estimate st. err. estimate st. erc.
INTERCEPT - 18.279 3.963 -3.407 6.195
AGE 0.938 0.175 0.486 0.234
AGE' -0.010 0.002 -0.0032 0.0024
FAMILY S[7.E -1.529 0.802 - 1.627 1.189
EDUC I 3.082 2.941 3.099 4.584
EDUC2 4.742 2.355 3.487 4.468
EDUC3 4.710 1.820 2.338 3.419
MALE 2.663 2.718 4.705 3.583
MARITAL STATUS 0.903 2.493 5.973 4.181
FAMILY SIZE' AGE 0.032 0.018 0.055 0.022
EDUC l' AGE -0.234 0.062 -0.261 0.082
EDUC2 ' AGE -0.226 0.052 -0.190 0.078
EDUC3 ' AGE -0. l88 0.040 -0.120 0.060
MALE ~ AGE -0.014 0.065 -0.075 0.069
MARITAL STATUS ; AGE 0.089 0.060 -0.068 0.07948
TABLE 8D INTIIAL LABOUR MARKET STATE AND VARIANCES
pazametervector (~ COVARIANCE STRUCTURE
variable estimate st. err. pazameter esdmate st. err.
INTERCEPT -2.793 0.300 a„ 2.776 0.006
AGE 0.221 0.016 oe„ -0.071 0.120
AGE~ -0.0031 0.0002 a,,,, 0.154 0.203
FAMIL.Y SIZE -0.190 0.047 a~ 0.362 0.102
FAM. SIZE' MALE 0.227 0.052 r -0.657 0.141
EDUC1 -0.677 0.084 a~ -0.012 0.029
EDUC2 -0.303 0.082 a~ -0.079 0.269
EDUC3 -0.161 0.075 a,. 8.743 0.077
MALE -0.0018 0.118 a,.6 6.701 0.148
MARTCAL STATUS 0.273 0.210
MAR. STAT. ~ MALE 0.260 0.22449
TABLE 9A THE JOINT MODEL: PROBABILITIES
STAYING-ON
PROBABILTTY










































































































TABLE 9B'PHE dOIN'T MODEL: THE ASSET EQUATION
EMPLOYED NONPARTICIP
parametervector n~ parametervector rl„
varíable estimate st. err. estimate st. err.
IN1'ERCEPT -8.351 0.865 -3.081 1.173
AGE 0.324 0.037 -0.096 0.045
AGE~ 0.0023 0.0004 0.0060 0.0005
FAMILY SIZE -0.227 0.158 -0.427 0.253
EDUC1 4.162 0.494 2.763 0.877
EDUC2 4.474 0.490 1.819 0.891
EDUC3 2.832 0.360 2.054 0.757
MALE 2.707 0.636 0.738 0.641
MARITAL STATUS -1. ( 94 0.536 0.289 0.852
FAMILY SI7.E' AGE 0.012 0.004 0.031 0.004
EDUC1 ' AGE -0.127 0.011 -0.103 0.016
EDUC2 ' AGE -0.142 0.01 I -0.065 0.016
EDUC3 ' AGE -0.096 0.008 -0.071 O.OI4
MALE ~ AGE -0.067 0.016 0.002 0.013
MARTTAL STATUS ~` AGE 0.062 0.014 i 0.(~63 0.01651
TABLE 9C INITIAL LABOUR MARKET STATE AND VARIANCES
parametervector ~i~ COVARIANCE STRUCTURE
variable estimatc u. erc. parart~eter estimate st. err.
IN7'ERCEPT -2.416 0.297 a„ 2.776 0.009
AGE 0.214 0.016 ae„ - I.047 0.073
AGEZ -0.0031 0.0002 a„„ -2.219 0.055
FAMILY SIZE -0.303 0.049 ae 0.792 0.119
FAM. SIZE' MALE 0.381 0.056 r 0.943 0.147
EDUCl -0.636 0.087 at l 1.856 0.028
EDUC2 -0.185 0.087 av -8.965 1.345
EDUC3 -0.042 0.079 a~ 0.096 0.036
MALE -0.3l4 0.123 a~á - l.223 0.497
MARITAL STATUS -0.230 0.214 a„~ -0.819 0.063
MAR. STAT. 'MALE 0.787 0.23152
TABLE 10
Period to period transition predictions
Current labour market state: EMPLOYMENT
MODEL: simple probit (table 4)





nonparticipation 63.9 (18.3~fo) 285.4 (3.996) 349.3
employment 285.1 (81.796) 7109.6 (96.196) 7394.7
total 349 7395 7744
Current labour market state: EMPLOY111~NT
MODEL: simple logit (table4)





nonparticipation 66.6 (19.196) 282.7 (3.8~0) 349.3
employment 282.4 (80.94b) 7112.3 (96.296) 7394.7
total 349 7395 ?744
t~in parentheses are the predlcted numbers, expns.ved in percentages ofthe observed numbers53
Current Isbour market state: EMPLOYMENT
MODEL: ad hoc random etYects modd (table ~





nonparticipation 66.6 (19.596) 264.6 (3.696) 332.8
employment 280.8 (80.596) 7130.4 (96.496) 741 1.2
total 349 7395 7744
Current labour market state: EMPLOYA~IVT
MODEL: simultaneous model (tabk 8)





nonparticipation 64.3 (18.496) 301.5 (4.196) 365.8
employment 284.7 (81.696) 7093.5 (95.996) 7378.2
total 349 ~ 7395 7744
Current labour market state: EMPLOYMENT
MODEL: simultaneous model (tabk 9)





nonparticipation 80.4 (23.096) 321.7 (4.496) 402.1
cmployment 268.6 (77.096) 7073.3 (95.696) 7341.9
total 349 7395 774454
Current labour market state: NONPARI'IC~ATION
MODEL: simple probit (table 5)





nonparticipation 2149.2 (92.396) 179.2 (73.496) 2328.4
employment 179.8 (7.796) 64.8 (26.696) 244.6
total 2329 244 2573
Current labour market state: NONPARTICIPATION
MODEL: simple logit (tabie 5)





nonparticipation 2151.6 (92.496) 177.5 (72.74b) 2329.1
employment 177.4 (7.696) 66.5 (27.396) 243.9
total 2329 244 2573
Current Isbour market state: NONPARTICIPATION
MODEL: ad hoc random effects model (table 7)





nonparticipation 2183.4 (93.7gb) 190.0 (77.94b) 2373.4
employment 145.5 (6.29b) 54.0 (22.196) 199.6
total 2329 244 257355
Current labour market state: NONPARTICIPA170N
MODEL: simultaneous model (tsbk 8)





nonparticipation 2134.3 (91.696) 178.9 (73.396) 2313.3
employment 194.7 ( 8.496) 65.1 (26.796) 259.7
total 2329 244 2573
Current labour market state: NONPARTICIPA170N
MODEL: simultaneous model (tabk 9)





nonparticipation 2068.3 (88.896) 153.4 (62.996) 2221.7
employment 260.7 ( I I.296) 90.6 (37.196) 351.3
total 2329 244 257356
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